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Mandated disclosures under IAS 36 Impairment of Assets and IAS 38 Intangible Assets: 
Value relevance and impact on analysts’ forecasts 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Drawing on a large sample of European firms, we examine whether variant compliance levels 
with mandated disclosures under IAS 36 Impairment of Assets and IAS 38 Intangible Assets 
are value relevant and affect analysts’ forecasts. Our results indicate a mean (median) 
compliance level of about 84% (86%) but high variation among firms; and disclosure levels 
regarding IAS 36 being much lower than those regarding IAS 38. In depth analysis reveals that 
non-compliance relates mostly to proprietary information and information that reveals 
managers’ judgment and expectations. Furthermore, we find a positive (negative) relationship 
between average disclosure levels and market values (analysts’ forecast dispersion). Results, 
however, hold more specifically for disclosures related to IAS 36, and these also improve 
analysts’ forecast accuracy. Our findings add knowledge regarding the economic consequences 
of mandatory disclosures, have an appeal to regulators and financial statement preparers, and 
reflect on the IASB’s concerns to increase the guidance and principles on presentation and 
disclosure. 
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1. Introduction 
Following on from the Post-Implementation Review of IFRS 3 Business Combinations (PIR), 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has added to its research agenda several 
issues, including whether changes should be made to the existing impairment test for non-
current, non-financial assets, including goodwill and the extent to which other intangible assets 
should be separated from goodwill. In order to take this decision, the Board took into 
consideration inter alia evidence from academic literature and other reports (IASB, 2015). This 
prior work, first, indicates that the extent of mergers and acquisitions has significantly 
increased the importance of intangible assets and goodwill in firms’ financial statements as a 
result of the requirements of IFRS 3 on acquisition (FRRP, 2006, p.4).1 Second, it has been 
consistently reported that there was an underlying issue of non-compliance with the disclosures 
mandated by IAS 36 Impairment of Assets and IAS 38 Intangible Assets during the early years 
of IFRS mandatory adoption by EU listed firms (see FRRP, 2006; the European Commission, 
2008; the ICAEW; 2007; the SEC, 2007; and Company Reporting Ltd, 2007; 2008). Beyond 
this, there is heated debate from standard setters and professional bodies about the usefulness 
of the disclosures mandated by accounting standards in general and intangible assets in 
particular (see for example IASB’s public Disclosure Forum in January 2013; EFRAG 2012; 
ICAS and NZICA 2011; Hans Hoogervorst’s speech on ‘Breaking the boilerplate’ in July 
2013). The most recent development in the area is the IASB’s ‘Disclosure Initiative’ and the 
recent Discussion Paper on the Principles of Disclosures.2 
                                                 
1 For example, an Ernst &Young (2009) study of over 700 deals that took place in 2007 indicates that, on average, 
23% of the deal values were allocated to identifiable assets, whilst close to 50% was allocated to goodwill. 
Tsalavoutas et al. (2014: 21) report that the mean (median) percentage of goodwill recognised over the purchase 
price is 54% (51%) for a sample of large international firms reporting under IFRS in 2010. 
2 http://www.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/Disclosure-Initiative/Pages/Disclosure-Initiative.aspx 
http://www.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/Disclosure-Initiative/Principles-of-
Disclosure/Pages/Exposure-Draft-and-Comment-letters.aspx 
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On reflection of this background and following prior studies (e.g., Mazzi et al., 2017; 
Glaum et al., 2013b; Tsalavoutas, 2011), in this study, we focus on the first year of the 
implementation of the revised IFRS 3 and on the two standards the debate from standard setters 
focuses on i.e., IAS 36 and IAS 38. More specifically, we first hand collect data and calculate 
the compliance score with the mandatory disclosure requirements of IAS 36 and IAS 38 for a 
sample of 373 listed companies from European countries in 2010/11. Considering that 
complying with the standards’ mandatory disclosure requirements implies disclosure of 
relevant information, we subsequently explore the value relevance of these 
compliance/disclosure levels as well as their relationship with analysts’ forecast accuracy and 
dispersion. Evidence in the relevant literature on this subject is absent. Thus, we provide 
evidence on the topic which is on standard setters’ agenda but also contribute to the accounting 
literature which calls for evidence regarding the valuation implications of mandatory 
disclosures (cf. Hassan et al., 2009; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016; Bushee and Leuz, 2005; Kang 
and Pang, 2005). 
Our results can be summarised as follows. The mean (median) level of compliance scores 
for our sample firms is 83.9% (85.7%) and significant variability in these scores is identified 
(standard deviation of 13.4%). The mean (median) compliance for IAS 36 is 81.9% (85.7%) 
and for IAS 38 is 85.9% (90%). The standard deviation of the compliance score for IAS 36 is 
18.9% and for IAS 38 is 15.5%. Even though the companies in our sample are among the 
largest in their country, there is a fairly large number of companies with compliance levels 
below 80% (131 for IAS 36 and 78 for IAS 38). In fact, minimum scores are as low as zero 
regarding IAS 36 and 33.3% for IAS 38.  
To shed more light on these results, we report the specific paragraphs for which frequent 
non-compliance (i.e., less than 90% compliance) is observed. These include assumptions and 
estimations used in the application of value in use calculations; the amounts of impairment 
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losses across reportable segments; the amount of intangible assets allocated to cash generating 
units; and the reasons for designating an intangible asset with indefinite useful life. Variation 
in this kind of information is particularly important for the purposes of our study given that it 
reflects the concerns highlighted in the literature about the information content of intangible 
assets as well as the implementation quality of the impairment tests.  
Finally, we find that the average disclosure levels are positively value relevant and reduce 
analysts’ forecast dispersion. In fact, when testing for the disclosure levels of each standard 
separately, we find that these results are driven mostly by the disclosure levels regarding IAS 
36. Accordingly, these findings indicate that increased levels of compliance with IAS 36 imply 
more transparent financial statements (Pownall and Schipper, 1999) and that greater 
transparency of information mitigates uncertainty about company fundamentals (Anctil et al., 
2004).  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant 
literature and the rationale of the study, leading to the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes 
the data and the research design employed. Section 4 provides the empirical findings and 
section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Background and hypotheses development 
2.1 Background: relevance and faithful representation 
A primary focus of the IASB and other standard setters is equity investment. Thus, the 
qualitative characteristics of relevance and faithful representation of financial statements are 
of most importance. It is commonly agreed that an item is relevant if it is capable of making a 
difference to financial statement users’ decisions (IASB, Conceptual Framework 2010, QC6). 
Additionally, ‘financial reports represent economic phenomena in words [emphasis added] and 
numbers. To be useful, financial information must not only represent relevant phenomena, but 
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it must also faithfully represent the phenomena that it purports to represent. To be a perfectly 
faithful representation, a depiction would have three characteristics. It would be complete 
[emphasis added], neutral and free from error’ (IASB, Conceptual Framework 2010, QC 12: 
18).  
For financial statements to adhere to these characteristics, each IFRS includes a list of 
items that companies should disclose. In this way, notes to the financial statements, including 
those on accounting policies, in which companies provide disclosures in response to these 
requirements, comprise an integral part of a complete set of financial statements (IAS 1, 
paragraph 8). The rationale for this reporting approach is that this kind of disclosures assist 
users of the financial statements to understand a company’s underlying economics (i.e., assets, 
liabilities and equity) and how their values are measured and change from year to year. This is 
in line with disclosure theories in that, the higher the levels of such disclosures, the higher the 
amount of both proprietary and non-proprietary information provided to financial statements 
users (Dye, 1986). This is because accounting policies are chosen by management and, as a 
result, companies reveal information through their choice of accounting techniques (Dye, 
1985). Subsequently, the users of financial statements take into account the policies a company 
elects as well as the outcomes of these policies. This process allows users of financial 
statements to make inferences about a company’s private information and subsequently make 
investment decisions. 
Additionally, the presence of such a structured framework for mandatory disclosures, 
would allow experienced users of the financial statements, like analysts, to analyse/interpret 
the disclosures provided or identify the absence of such disclosures. Again in line with 
disclosure theories, omission or provision of disclosures mandated by regulations (i.e., 
accounting standards in this case) may affect investor perceptions about a company’s prospects, 
i.e., they may cause real and/or financial externalities (Dye, 1990). A real externality is created 
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when a company’s disclosure relates to its own cash flows that may change other companies’ 
cash flows (Dye, 1990). An example is the detailed disclosure of a company’s contingent 
liabilities. A financial externality is created when the disclosures of a company in one industry 
affect investors’ perceptions about the profitability of other companies in the same industry 
and consequently the latter’s market values (Dye (1990) with reference to Foster (1981)).  
Thus, it is expected that differential levels of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures 
should be correlated with market values (i.e., being value relevant) and influence analysts’ 
forecasts. Indeed, there is some but scarce evidence in the prior literature which would support 
this assertion (see more discussion below). In this study, we focus on the disclosures mandated 
by IAS 36 and IAS 38 for which evidence in this regard is absent. 
 
2.2 Hypotheses development 
IAS 38 governs the recognition criteria and measurement models as well as relevant disclosures 
on intangible assets. IAS 38 (paragraph 8) defines an intangible asset as ‘an identifiable non-
monetary asset without physical substance’. Even if an item satisfies the definition and 
recognition criteria of an intangible asset, it should be shown on the statement of financial 
position of a firm only if a) it is probable that future economic benefits will flow to the 
enterprise and b) the item has a cost that can be measured with reliability (Tsalavoutas et al., 
2014: 25). Goodwill falls out of this definition given that it is a non-identifiable asset, without 
physical substance. Hence, it is not considered by IAS 38. Goodwill is an asset recognised in 
a business combination representing future economic benefits arising from expected synergies 
not individually identified and separately recognised (Mazzi et al., 2017).  
Given the nature of such assets and the lack of active markets for them, the estimated value 
of future economic benefits and the probability that these benefits will flow in the company 
can be debatable. Nevertheless, prior literature indicates that a large proportion of companies’ 
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non-current assets consist of goodwill and intangible assets. For example, using a sample of 
27,172 European firm-year observations for the period between 2006 and 2015, André et al., 
(2016) report a mean (median) level of goodwill to total assets of 16.7% (11.8%).3 A study 
from EFRAG (2016) which examines only the constituents of the S&P Europe 350, for the 
same period, finds a similar ratio of 17% when excluding the financial sector (3.5% when 
included). André et al., (2016) also report a goodwill to equity ratio with a mean (median) of 
47.4% (30.0%). Mazzi et al., (2017), who like the EFRAG (2016) study focus on the 
constituents of the S&P Europe 350 but for the period between 2008 and 2011, find similar 
levels of goodwill to net book value. In addition, using a sample of very large companies from 
23 countries across the world, Tsalavoutas et al., (2014: 26) find that total intangibles (other 
than goodwill) to total assets range from 1.6 % (in China) to 13.5% (in the UK), while the value 
is between 5% and 10% for the majority of the remaining countries.4  
Considering the magnitudes of these values and the fact that companies have investments 
in other assets as well, the reliability of the amounts of goodwill, intangible assets (and other 
assets) themselves and/or the anticipation and estimation of a potential impairment, would be 
of critical importance to users of the financial statements. This is why IAS 36 contains 
disclosure requirements that ‘are designed to improve the reliability of the impairment test’ 
(IAS 36, Basis for conclusions, paragraph 198), which is primarily based on managerial 
assumptions and proprietary information (Mazzi et al., 2017).  
As explained by Mazzi et al., (2016: 354), with reference to evidence from CFOs of Italian 
listed firms, ‘IAS 36 is perceived as a complex, detailed and atypical accounting standard 
among the IFRS, allowing for subjectivity in its application, being adaptable to managerial 
needs and unable to limit creative accounting’. This is because IAS 36 sets the procedures that 
                                                 
3 André et al., (2016) report similar values for companies in the US for the same period. 
4 Further, McInnis and Monsen (2017), whose dataset contains 4,166 firm-years containing at least one acquisition 
in the US for the period between 2003 to 2014, report that intangibles (other than goodwill) make up on average 
35.0% of the purchase price, resulting identifiable intangible assets of $730 billion. 
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a firm should apply to ensure that its assets are carried at no more than their recoverable 
amount. If an asset is carried at a value higher than its recoverable amount, it has to be impaired 
and an impairment loss immediately recognised in profit or loss, unless the asset is carried at 
revalued amount where an adjustment in other comprehensive income may have to take place 
first (IAS 36, par. 59–60). Given that the impairment testing process relies critically on the 
estimation of an asset’s recoverable amount, the largest part of the standard is devoted to the 
measurement of the recoverable amount. Extensive discussion is provided around the 
identification of Cash Generating Units (CGUs), the allocation of goodwill to CGUs, the 
recognition of an impairment loss and its reversal. More specifically, to assist users’ 
understanding and to alleviate the concerns around the inherent flexibility in the impairment 
testing process, IAS 36 requires preparers to disclose information mostly related to the 
assumptions made in estimating recoverable amount, to any reasonably possible changes in 
these estimates, and to the events and circumstances that led to the recognition or reversal of 
an impairment loss. 
The two standards we focus on require disclosures regarding the assumptions and the 
methods used to determine accounting items recognised in the financial statements. Some 
examples of mandatory disclosures within these standards which could provide value relevant 
information to investors and thus have valuation implications include the following: a) the 
amount of impairment losses and reversals of such losses recognised during the period (IAS 
36); b) the events and circumstances that led to the recognition of such impairment losses and 
reversals of such losses (IAS 36); c) if recoverable amount is measured at fair value less costs 
to sell: the basis used to determine fair value less costs to sell (IAS 36); d) if recoverable amount 
is measured at value in use: the discount rate(s) used in the current estimate and previous 
estimate (if any) of value in use (IAS 36); e) the amortisation methods used for intangible assets 
with finite useful lives (IAS 38); f) a reconciliation of the carrying amount of intangible assets 
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(including goodwill) at the beginning and end of the period (IAS 38); and h) the aggregate 
amount of research and development expenditure recognised as an expense during the period 
(IAS 38).  
The disclosure of such information enhances faithful representation and overall 
transparency (Pownall and Schipper, 1999). It provides the users of financial statements with 
information regarding how the company perceives its prospects (Hope, 2003a). These 
arguments are particularly relevant to the present study since these standards force companies 
to disclose information irrespective of these providing good or bad news to the users of 
financial statements (cf. Verrecchia, 2001). Our research instrument captures whether this 
information is disclosed and our tests explore whether these disclosures are informative for 
forecasting earnings and for valuation purposes. Accordingly, we test the following 
hypotheses, in the alternative form: 
Hypothesis 1 - (H1):  IFRS mandatory disclosure levels (for each individual standard as well 
as in aggregate) are value relevant. 
Hypothesis 2 - (H2):  IFRS mandatory disclosure levels (for each individual standard as well 
as in aggregate) increase analysts’ forecast accuracy. 
Hypothesis 3 - (H3):  IFRS mandatory disclosure levels (for each individual standard as well 
as in aggregate) reduce analysts’ forecast dispersion. 
 
As far as H1 is concerned, we do not predict the sign of the relationship between market value 
and mandatory disclosures. Prior literature suggests positive valuation implications of 
increased levels of (voluntary) disclosure. However, the implications of mandatory disclosures 
are ‘theoretically far from clear and heavily debated’ (Bushee and Leuz 2005: 234). Therefore, 
as discussed above, higher compliance leads to higher levels of disclosure of both proprietary 
and non-proprietary information and/or both good and bad news (cf. Leuz and Wysocki, 2008; 
Verrecchia, 2001). Accordingly, higher compliance may have a positive impact on one 
company’s market value but a negative impact on another’s.  
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Furthermore, complying with detailed IFRS mandatory disclosures implies high direct 
costs for companies. Non-compliance costs include monetary fines, market pressure and the 
threat of de-listing. Depending on the institutional environment, if the costs of compliance with 
mandatory disclosures are high and the non-compliance costs negligible, non-compliance 
companies might be better off not disclosing all the information required (cf. Hassan et al., 
2009). In fact, investors may even be suspicious of a company with high compliance within a 
regime where enforcement is low. In such an environment, incurring high direct costs for 
achieving high compliance may place a company ‘at a competitive disadvantage relative to its 
competitors who failed to publish such mandatory details’ (Hassan et al., 2009: 85). 
An illustrative example of the above arguments are the mixed findings of Hassan et al. 
(2009), Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou (2014) and Abdullah et al. (2015). Hassan et al. (2009) 
examine the value relevance of mandatory disclosure levels for a sample of 80 Egyptian firms, 
over the period 1995 to 2002. The second study examines the value relevance of compliance 
with IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements for a sample of 139 Greek firms in 2005. Hassan 
et al. (2009) report a negative relationship and Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou (2014) find a 
positive relationship between market values and mandatory disclosure levels. Nevertheless, 
Abdullah et al. (2015) examine the value relevance of mandatory disclosure levels for a sample 
of 225 Malaysian firms for 2008. They find that mandatory disclosure levels are not value 
relevant.  
As for H2 and H3, there is very little research that has examined the impact of mandated 
disclosures on analysts’ forecast characteristics. Hope (2003b) finds that the level of accounting 
policy disclosures is significant and negatively related to consensus forecast errors and 
dispersion, and that accounting policy disclosures are incrementally useful to analysts over and 
above all other annual report disclosures. This is consistent with the view that such disclosures 
reduce uncertainty about forecasted earnings. In a related study, Hope (2003a) reports the 
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important role of enforcement, arguing that enforcement encourages firms to follow prescribed 
rules, which in turn reduces investors’ uncertainty and leads to more accurate analysts’ 
forecasts. He provides evidence that both disclosure and strong enforcement are associated 
with improved consensus forecast accuracy.  
A number of papers examine the impact of differing accounting standards or the 
introduction of IFRS on analysts’ forecast characteristics (Bae et al. 2008; Byard et al. 2011; 
Glaum et al. 2013a; Horton et al. 2013; Tan et al. 2011). They argue and find that better quality 
standards reduce forecast errors and dispersion. Looking more specifically at disclosure 
quality, Hodgdon et al. (2008) investigate the relationship between analysts’ earnings forecast 
errors and firm compliance with the disclosure requirements of IFRS around 1999-2000. They 
document that forecast error is negatively related to IFRS compliance suggest that compliance 
with the disclosure requirements of IFRS reduces information asymmetry and enhances the 
ability of financial analysts to provide more accurate forecasts. Their findings also support the 
viewpoint that the extent of compliance with accounting standards is as important as the 
standards themselves. Our paper differs from theirs in that they examine a period when IFRS 
were voluntary and much less developed, whereas we examine a period when IFRS are 
mandatory and disclosure requirements are more developed. 
 
 
 
 
3. Data and research design   
3.1 Measuring compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements 
We follow Glaum et al. (2013b) and Tsalavoutas (2011) in the method for measuring 
compliance. A disclosure index containing all the items mandated by IAS 36 and IAS 38 is 
13 
 
used as a scoring sheet for each company. We base our scoring sheet on the one developed by 
Tsalavoutas (2011), which has already been tested for its validity. We updated this scoring list 
in line with the requirements introduced and the changes made to the two standards that were 
applicable for the financial periods beginning after 1 July 2009. The final disclosure checklist 
includes 58 mandatory items: 39 relate to IAS 36 and 19 items relate to IAS 38. 
Subsequently, we compute a disclosure score with regard to the disclosures mandated by 
each standard separately (i.e., IAS36_CS and IAS38_CS) via an unweighted disclosure index 
method. This approach assumes that each mandated item is of equal importance. So, if a 
required item was disclosed, it was scored as 1 and if not, it was scored as 0. Some items might 
not be applicable to every company, and were therefore scored as ‘not applicable’.5 Following 
this, the compliance with each standard’s mandatory disclosures is calculated as the ratio of 
the total items mandated by this particular standard and disclosed by each firm to the maximum 
items from that standard which are applicable to that company. This is expressed as follows:  


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1       (Eq. 1) 
Where Cj is the total compliance score for each company and is restricted between 0 and 1. T 
is the total number of items disclosed (di) by company j and M is the maximum number of 
applicable disclosure items for company j that could have been disclosed following a standard’s 
requirements.  
In addition to these two separate measures, we compute two average scores. In the first 
(Aver_1), we assume that each standard is of equal importance, and thus, each standard has 
equal weight. So, this average score is the total compliance score for each company and is 
                                                 
5 In order to avoid penalising a company for non-compliance with a standard or item which might not be 
applicable, a thorough reading of the complete annual is needed prior to proceeding with examining compliance 
(Cooke, 1992). This approach was followed in the present study. 
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restricted between 0 and 1. It is obtained by the calculation of the compliance with each 
standard’s mandatory disclosures separately (Cj), adding these compliance scores (i.e., 
IAS36_CS and IAS38_CS) and dividing the sum by the total number of relevant/applicable 
standards for each company j.  
Given the significantly different number of items required by IAS 36 compared to IAS 38, 
we consider this aggregate score capturing compliance with these two standards in a more 
balanced/appropriate way. This is in line with Tsalavoutas et al.’s (2010) suggestion that this 
method is more appropriate for measuring compliance levels with a number of standards or 
information categories, when the number of items in each of them varies significantly and if 
each standard/category are perceived of equal importance. 
In the second (Aver_2), each mandated item is of equal importance, irrespective of how 
many items a standard mandates and in which standard the item is included. Again, this score 
is the total compliance score for each company and is restricted between 0 and 1. It is derived 
by dividing the total number of items disclosed by a company by the maximum number of 
applicable disclosure items for that company that could have been disclosed following both 
standards’ requirements. (See Tsalavoutas et al. (2010) and Tsalavoutas (2011) for details on 
these two scoring methods).6  
 
 
3.2 Sample  
The study period has been decided as follows. Because of a desired convergence on the topic 
of business combinations between the IASB and FASB, for financial periods starting on or 
after 1 July 2009, IFRS 3 became effective. The revisions in this standard introduced a number 
                                                 
6 To ensure the reliability of the research instrument, we scored 10 randomly selected companies independently. 
We then compared our findings. Given that the final research instrument had been agreed by all investigators, 
differences in the compliance scores across the investigators were insignificant.  
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of significant changes in the way business combinations are recorded and how goodwill and 
other intangible assets are valued when a business combination is recognised. Additionally, 
because of this revised standard, changes were introduced in IAS 36. As a result, we chose to 
examine compliance with mandatory disclosures in the areas that are relevant to these two 
standards (i.e., intangible assets and their impairment) in the first year of their implementation. 
Our sample represents the ‘blue chip’ companies (excluding the financial institutions) in 
Europe.7 We first collect data for the non-financial constituents of the S&P Europe 350 Index, 
which includes the largest and more liquid EU companies. In addition to these companies, 
European firms included in large-cap country-specific indices are added to the potential sample 
in order to increase sample size at the country level. Firms cross-listed in more than one country 
of investigation are included only for the country of primary listing. Firms with dual shares are 
excluded.8 After identifying the financial year end for each firm, the company annual report is 
collected from the company’s webpage or Thomson One Banker database. Firms following US 
GAAP and Canadian GAAP are excluded. Firms for which financial or other necessary data 
are not available are also excluded.  
As the research investigates levels of compliance with two standards, firms for which none 
of the two standards apply are removed from the sample. The disclosures required by IAS 36 
are applicable even if a firm does not recognise any impairment loss, simply because it has to 
test goodwill and other intangible assets with indefinite useful lives annually for impairment. 
If an impairment and/or a reversal of an impairment takes place and is material, further 
disclosures are triggered. A 5% threshold of impairment over profit before tax is applied to 
                                                 
7 We exclude financial companies because of the differences in the nature of their operations and because they are 
subject to different regulations. This is common in the relevant literature on compliance with mandatory 
disclosures (e.g., Mazzi et al., 2017; Abdullah et al., 2015) as well as the literature examining analysts’ forecasts 
(e.g., Bozzolan et al., 2009; Glaum et al., 2013a). 
8 This results in the exclusion of six potential observations. However, although a firm may be listed in more than 
one stock-markets, its financial statements are the same. Hence, we cannot include the same compliance scores 
and financial statements related items twice in the sample.  
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determine whether an impairment or a reversal of an impairment was regarded as material and, 
therefore, should necessitate more relevant disclosures. As a result, to render the standard 
inapplicable, a firm should not have any goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite useful 
life and should not have recognised a material impairment or reversal of impairment for its 
remaining assets. As far as disclosure mandated by IAS 38 is concerned, if a company elects 
to report separately the net book value of a class of intangible assets in its financial statements, 
it is assumed that the company considers this item to be material and, as a result, the 
corresponding mandated disclosure should be disclosed.  
Following the application of these criteria, 373 companies from 16 EU countries were left 
in the sample for the reporting year 2010/11. Table 1 shows the number of firms across country 
and industry. Most sample firms are listed in the UK (83) and France (42) and are part of the 
Industrials (99), Basic Materials (42), Consumer Services (51) and Consumer Goods (57) 
International Classification Benchmark (ICB) industry sectors. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
3.3 The models employed 
To test H1, we follow Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010), Sinkin et al. (2008) and Clarkson et al. 
(2013), among others, and use Ohlson’s (1995) model as a framework. The model can be 
expressed as follows: 
Pj 0jΧjvjj        (Eq. 2) 
where Pj stands for the value of a company, Bj is the book value of shareholders’ equity, Xj net 
profit and v is ‘other information’ available to the market participants but not yet captured by 
accounting (i.e. events that have not yet affected B and X) (Myers, 1999), and j is the mean 
zero disturbance term.  
This valuation framework combines accounting and non-accounting data. Ohlson (2001) 
explains that excluding v from the equation makes the model ‘patently simplistic’. Assuming 
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v is zero implies that what matters in the setting of market values is only the publicly available 
information of the book value of shareholders’ equity and net income. Expectations or 
information about future prospects and future income which essentially are not recognised in 
the financial statements are ‘heroically’ assumed to be of no relevance. This may lead to 
potentially inaccurate conclusions regarding the coefficients of the variables included in the 
model.  
Following along these lines, the compliance score of each company (CS) is included in 
Equation 2, as a third independent variable (i.e., as a proxy for ‘other information’). In addition, 
considering that our sample firms are listed in countries of significantly different socio-
economic contexts, we include additional country-specific controls. The extent to which 
financial statements’ quality is high or low and the extent to which financial statements are 
trusted by investors as tools for investment decisions (i.e., the extent to they are value relevant 
and also influence analysts’ forecasts) may depend on the socio-economic context of each 
country in our sample.9 These additions lead to the following equation: 
jm
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(Eq. 3) 
where MVjt is the market value of a company j four months after the publication of the financial 
statements relating to the financial period (WC08001). (This ensures that the accounting 
information is in the public domain and has been ‘absorbed’ by investors (cf. Tsalavoutas et 
al., 2012); BVEj is the book value of net assets at the end of the financial period (WC03501); 
                                                 
9 For example, higher earnings’ quality could result in higher value relevance of earnings. Additionally, the more 
readable a company’s financial statements, the easier for financial statement users to comprehend and analyse the 
information in them. This would lead to higher value relevance of accounting information. Further, the higher the 
enforcement mechanisms of accounting and security regulations, the higher the value relevance of accounting 
information would be. Finally, the more developed a market is, the more sophisticated investors would follow 
listed firms and analyse their financial statements. This would lead to higher value relevance of accounting 
information. Following along these lines, these characteristics would result in lower analysts’ forecasts’ errors 
and dispersion. 
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NIj is the net profit after tax for the financial period (WC01751); CSj is the mandatory 
disclosure compliance score; Mkt_Devj is the market capitalisation of listed companies as a 
percentage of GDP for each country (World Bank); Enforcej is an index combining the level 
of activity of independent enforcement bodies and important features of the audit environment 
likely to affect the quality of enforcement of financial reporting requirements by auditors in a 
country  where the higher the index the stronger the enforcement environment (see Preiato et 
al. 2013); AWCAj is the absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals scaled by total 
assets (see DeFond and Park 2001);10 Readability is the logarithmic transformation of annual 
report page count; the vector DLegalOrigin is a set of dummy variables capturing legal systems 
of French, Scandinavian and German origin with English being the benchmark group (see 
Djankov et al. 2008); and εj is the mean zero disturbance term.  
We test H2 and H3 by employing the following regression models: 
jm
jjjjjjjj
jjjjjjj
nLegalOrigiDb
IndbListUSbChNIbLossbHorbAnFolbIntbpairb
SIZEbadabilitybAWCAbEnforcebDevMktbCSbaDisper



 )(
__Im
Re_
1413121110987
6543210
 
(Eq. 4) 
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(Eq. 5) 
where Disperj is the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts (I/B/E/S) (last I/B/E/S forecast 
prior to the EPS announcement), scaled by share price; Accurj is the absolute value of the 
difference between mean I/B/E/S forecast (last I/B/E/S forecast prior to the EPS 
announcement) and actual EPS, scaled by stock price [we multiply this variable by -1 so as to 
                                                 
10 AWCA = (WCt – WCt-1*St / St-1) / TAt. WC stands for working capital accruals, computed as current assets 
(WC02201) – cash & equivalents (WC02001) – current liabilities (WC03101) + short term debt (WC03051). 
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be interpreted as accuracy; the higher the better]; SIZEjt is natural logarithm of the market value 
of a company j four months after the publication of the financial statements (WC08001); 
Impairj is an indicator variable that takes 1 if an impairment is reported and 0 otherwise (hand 
collected); Intj is the ratio between total intangible assets, including goodwill, and total assets 
(hand collected); AnFolj is the number of analysts contributing to the forecast as reported by 
I/B/E/S; Horj is measured as the number of months from the forecast date until the company 
releases its actual earnings (I/B/E/S); Lossj is an indicator variable for loss making companies; 
NI_Chj is the absolute value of the change in earnings between current earnings and that of the 
previous year, scaled by last year's earnings; US_Listj is a binary variable that takes a value of 
one when the firm is listed in the US and zero otherwise (identified via DataStream); Indj takes 
a value of one when a firm is categorised into ‘manufacturing’ on the basis of their industry 
participation, according to ICB, and zero otherwise.11 All remaining variables are the same as 
in Equation 4. 
All monetary values are converted into euros. If the firm’s reporting currency is not the 
euro, the corresponding historic (daily) bilateral exchange rate, as at the financial year end day, 
stated on the European Central Bank website is used to convert the collected figures in euros 
(or as at four months later when calculating the firm market value four months after the year-
end). 
In all our tests, we employ the ‘Heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator 
3 (HC3)’, to address concerns related to heteroskedasticity. This alternative method tends to 
produce better results than White’s (1980) basic method, as it produces confidence intervals 
which tend to be even more conservative (MacKinnon and White, 1985). As heteroskedasticity 
                                                 
11 Ind equals one when a firm operates in one of the following industry sectors: basic materials, consumer goods, 
industrials, oil and gas or technology. Consequently it takes a value of zero when the company is in the consumer 
services, healthcare, telecommunications or utilities industries. Arguably, this dummy may not capture the 
diversity of industries in the sample. Hence, we repeat all our analyses by substituting the one dummy variable 
we now have, with industry fixed effects based on the ICB Level 2 as this indicated in Table 1. These results 
confirm the findings of our main analyses.  
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can also arise from the presence of outliers, we define and exclude outliers when the 
standardised residuals lie outside the range of +/-2 standard deviations. 
The scale bias is another common problem when one implements the Ohlson (1995) model 
since it may introduce heteroskedasticity. To address this issue, in Equation 4, we scale MV, 
BVE and NI by total assets.12 Finally, multicollinearity was checked with a variance inflation 
factor (VIF)>10 as a threshold and maximum VIF is reported for every regression presented in 
our results, suggesting no multicollinearity issues.  
 
4. Empirical findings and discussion 
4.1 Compliance levels 
Table 2 reports the frequency and distribution of the compliance scores across our sample 
firms. Mean (median) degree of average compliance (Aver_1) is relatively high: 83.9% 
(85.7%). However, consistent with prior studies, high variation is observed among firms’ 
mandatory disclosure levels (e.g., Al-Shammari et al. 2008, Al-Akra et al. 2010, Tsalavoutas 
2011, Glaum et al. 2013b). The standard deviation is 13.4% while the minimum compliance 
level is 25%. Nevertheless, there are many fully compliant firms. In fact, 37% of the sample 
firms is disclosing between 90% and 100% of the required disclosures but some 32% of the 
sample firms only complies between 25% and 79%.13 This important variability of compliance 
scores indicates that a differential quantity of information reached the users of financial 
statements.  
The levels of compliance with individual standards confirm the variability of disclosures 
provided. Mean (median) compliance with IAS 36 is 81.9% (85.7%) and compliance for this 
standard exhibits a very high standard deviation (18.9%). A noted finding is that 61 firms (i.e., 
                                                 
12 Repeating the analysis by using the number of shares outstanding as an alternative scaling factor does not lead 
to qualitatively different conclusions. 
13 The findings regarding Aver_2 are qualitatively similar and are not discussed for brevity. 
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16.3% of our sample) exhibit compliance levels between 0% and 69%. Mean and median 
compliance with the requirements of IAS 38 is higher to that of IAS 36 (i.e., 85.9% and 90%). 
Although still high, the standard deviation of compliance for this standard is lower than IAS 
36 (i.e., 15.5%). The number of companies exhibiting compliance levels lower than 69% is 
identical to IAS 36 (i.e., 61), but no firm exhibits compliance levels lower than 33.3%. Further, 
295 (79.1% of our sample firms) exhibit compliance between 80% and 100%.  
TABLE 2 – ABOUT HERE 
Table 3 provides information regarding specific items mandated by IAS 36 and IAS 38 which 
are applicable to equal or more than 20% of our sample firms (i.e., 73 companies) and for which 
high non-compliance (i.e., less than 90% compliance) is observed. The compliance levels with 
these items are indicative of the variation of important firm-specific information that reaches 
users of financial statements. In fact, these descriptive statistics reveal the discretion companies 
apply with regard to provision of proprietary and non-proprietary information around 
intangible assets and impairment tests which could reveal good and bad news. From the 
standard setter’s point of view, this list of items reveals areas within individual IFRS which 
may need to be addressed, either at the standard level or within the IASB’s Disclosure Initiative 
project, by providing guidance on how these requirements should be interpreted and applied 
by companies. We highlight noticeable observations. 
Regarding the disclosures mandated by IAS 36, our analysis reveals that many companies 
do not disclose the actual impairment loss or a reversal of impairment loss across reportable 
segments. Furthermore, many firms do not disclose the main events and circumstances that led 
to the recognition of impairment losses or reversal of impairment losses. Moreover, for the 
majority of our sample firms which use the value in use impairment testing method for goodwill 
or intangible assets with indefinite useful lives, a large proportion of them remains silent 
regarding aspects of the impairment testing process (e.g., description of assumptions used, the 
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approach used for determining these assumptions, justifications about the period of cash flows 
used and/or the growth rate used to extrapolate cash flows beyond the period covered by 
management budgets).  
Many of these items can be described as proprietary because there is evidence from 
preparers themselves that this information will probably not be disclosed on a voluntary basis. 
This is because it can cause significant commercial harm to an entity and may be used to initiate 
litigation against it in the event that these assumptions prove less than accurate (see the 
evidence from preparers as provided in ASBJ et al., 2014). However, this information could be 
critical for investors, analysts and lenders in their decision-making process (see relevant 
discussion in FRC, 2014; KPMG, 2014). In fact, being able to predict the outcome of the 
impairment testing is an important input to users’ assessment of the amount, timing and 
uncertainty of (the prospect for) future net cash inflows (see the evidence from preparers as 
provided in ASBJ et al., 2014). 
Not disclosing this information appears to confirm the concerns expressed in the literature 
about the quality of goodwill impairment tests (Hoogendoorn 2006, Carlin and Finch 2009, 
2010) which can lead to decisions that essentially serve earnings management, reducing the 
information value to investors (Ramanna and Watts, 2012). Finally, a large number of firms 
does not reveal the carrying amount of goodwill and/or intangible assets with indefinite useful 
lives allocated to one or more of its cash-generating units (group of units). Lack of this 
information would further hinder investors’ ability to evaluate the risks and returns associated 
with key components of a firm. 
Looking into the disclosures mandated by IAS 38, similarly, a large number of our sample 
firms apply discretion around information that would allow readers of the financial statements 
to evaluate how the company’s profit has been derived and how the company perceives its 
future prospects. More specifically, information about whether the useful lives of intangible 
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assets are indefinite or finite and, if finite, the useful lives or the amortisation rates used; the 
amortisation methods used for intangible assets with finite useful lives; and the line item(s) of 
the statement of comprehensive income in which any amortisation of intangible assets is 
included is not disclosed by a large number of firms. Additionally, many of the firms which 
have intangibles asset(s) with an indefinite useful life remain silent regarding the reasons 
justifying this designation and the factor(s) that played a significant role in determining that 
the asset has an indefinite useful life. 
TABLE 3 – ABOUT HERE 
4.2 Univariate analyses 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in the 
multivariate analyses. Mean (median) market value of equity to total assets (MV) is 1.07 (0.81). 
Mean (median) Disper is 0.07 (0.01) and mean (median) Accur is -0.08 (-0.01). Mean for 
Impair is 69%, indicating that 69% of our sample firms recognise an impairment. Additionally, 
mean (median) of Int is 29% (21%), indicating that a material value of total assets relates to 
intangible assets. The prior two findings suggest that a large number of our sample firms would 
be required to provide more disclosures under IAS 36 and IAS 38 because of recognising 
impairments and large values of intangibles.  
Firms are followed by about 3 analysts (AnFol). The dummy variable US_List shows that 
nearly one quarter of our sample firms are listed both in a European market and in the US. 
Variation with regard to market development and enforcement mechanisms among the 
countries investigated is also evident.  
TABLE 4 – ABOUT HERE 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients between all variables are presented in Table 5. As one would 
expect, the average disclosure scores (Aver_1 & Aver_2) correlate highly positively 
(coefficient of 0.956, p < 0.01). Statistically significant is also the correlation between the 
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disclosure scores of each separate standard (IAS36_CS and IAS38_CS). Consistent with our 
hypotheses, preliminary evidence shows that there is a positive and statistically significant 
correlation between MV and mandatory disclosure Aver_1, Aver_2, IAS36_CS and IAS38_CS: 
0.146 (p < 0.01), 0.136 (p < 0.01), 0.103 (p < 0.01), and 0.125 (p < 0.05), respectively. 
Additionally, there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between Disper and 
mandatory disclosure Aver_1, Aver_2, IAS36_CS and IAS38_CS: 0.192 (p < 0.01), 0.197 (p < 
0.01), 0.196 (p < 0.01) and 0.092 (p < 0.10) respectively. We are at odds to explain the negative 
and statistically significant correlation between Accur and mandatory disclosure, but these 
remain univariate tests.  
From the correlations reported among the remaining variables we highlight the following. 
Both enforcement (Enforce) and market development (Mkt_Dev) document positive and highly 
significant correlations (p < 0.01) with both the average disclosure score (Aver_1 and Aver_2) 
and the score regarding IAS 36 related disclosures (IAS36_CS). This suggests that the stronger 
the enforcement in a country and the more developed a market is the higher the levels of 
mandatory disclosures provided to the market participants are.  
TABLE 5 – ABOUT HERE 
4.3 Multivariate analyses 
Table 6 reports the findings of the multivariate analyses regarding our three hypotheses. 
Starting with H1, the average compliance scores (Aver_1 and Aver_2) are positively related to 
market values (coefficients of 0.452 and 0.520, p < 0.05 respectively). When looking at the 
tests by disaggregating the combined compliance scores i.e., by testing the potential value 
relevance of compliance with the disclosure requirements of each standard separately, we find 
that only the disclosure levels regarding IAS 36 are value relevant (IAS36_CS has a coefficient 
of 0.328, p < 0.01). These findings allow us to infer strong support for our first hypothesis, 
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while they suggest that the variation in the disclosures associated with IAS 36 matter most to 
investors. 
Turning into the tests regarding H2, the average compliance scores (Aver_1 and Aver_2) 
are negatively related to analysts’ forecast dispersion (coefficients of -0.066 and 0.062, both 
significant at the 5%). When looking at the tests regarding the disclosure requirements of each 
standard separately, we also find that only the disclosure levels regarding IAS 36 reduce 
analysts’ forecast dispersion (IAS36_CS has a coefficient of -0.044, p < 0.05). These findings 
also allow us to infer strong support for second hypothesis, although they similarly suggest that 
the variation in the disclosures associated with IAS 38 does not affect analysts’ forecast 
dispersion. 
Finally, when looking at the results regarding our third hypothesis, we note the following. 
The average compliance scores (Aver_1 and Aver_2) are not related to analysts’ forecast 
accuracy. Nevertheless, we also find that only the compliance scores regarding IAS 36 improve 
analysts’ forecast accuracy (IAS36_CS has a coefficient of 0.055, significant at the 5% level). 
Thus, these findings allow us to also infer some support for our third hypothesis. They suggest 
that only the variation in the disclosures associated with IAS 36 results in analysts making 
fewer errors while forecasting company’s earnings.  
The consistent evidence about the implications arising from the disclosure levels 
associated with what IAS 36 mandates is not surprising, given the great disparity of information 
disclosed as indicated in Table 3. The fact that a large number of companies recognise an 
impairment and have very large amounts of intangible assets (including goodwill) recognised 
on their balance sheets, would make the disclosure of associated information even more 
relevant to investors. 
TABLE 6 – ABOUT HERE 
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Overall, these results indicate that levels of mandatory disclosure requirements do convey 
information to investors which assists in predicting future earnings. Furthermore, these 
findings imply that companies with higher compliance exhibit higher market values. Thus, 
companies exercising positive discretion on disclosing information which provides proprietary 
information and reveals managers’ judgement and expectations, benefit from an increased 
market value. It appears that high compliance companies are perceived as ‘good’ and 
‘responsible’, representing ‘good practice’ and consequently are ‘rewarded’ by investors (cf. 
Goncharov et al., 2006). 
 
5. Conclusions 
We consider relevance and faithful representation of IFRS mandatory disclosures as a key 
feature of companies’ financial statements and we score compliance with the mandatory 
disclosure requirements of IAS 36 and IAS 38 for a sample of 373 listed companies from 
European countries in 2010/11. This is the first year of the revised versions of these standards 
as a result of the revised IFRS 3. Considering that complying with the standards’ mandatory 
disclosure requirements implies disclosure of information, we subsequently explore the value 
relevance of these compliance/disclosure levels and their effects on analysts’ forecast accuracy 
and dispersion. This analysis is also motivated by surveys from professional bodies and/or 
standard setters who report the views of analysts on the subject (e.g., EY 2010; KPMG 2014; 
FRC, 2014; ASBJ et al. 2014). All of them identify disclosures in IAS 36 and IAS 38 as key 
for informing analysts’ investment decisions.  
We document evidence that companies exercising positive discretion on disclosing 
information which provides proprietary information and reveals managers’ judgement and 
expectations, benefit from an increased market value. Additionally, for companies exercising 
such discretion, analysts make less dispersed forecasts and these are more accurate. This 
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evidence supports the argument that mandatory disclosures provide insights into key 
accounting matters and result in more transparent financial statements (c.f., Pownall and 
Schipper 1999) which, in turn, reduces economic uncertainty about companies (Hope 2003, 
Anctil et al. 2004). 
Our study contributes to knowledge in the following ways. First, we provide useful insights 
to standard setters and respond to Buijink’s (2006) and Teixeira’s (2014) calls for academic 
research that could assist in the development of more evidence-informed accounting standard-
setting. Reflecting on recent concerns by standard setters and regulators (e.g., ANC 2011, 
EFRAG et al. 2012, FRC 2012, ESMA 2013, Hoogervorst 2013, IASB, 2013) about the 
usefulness of mandatory disclosures, this study informs in this debate by revealing issues 
arising in practice and relate to the application of existing IFRS for which specific 
guidance/principles of disclosures is absent. Our findings suggest that further guidance and 
existence of communication principles would be a positive step forward. This will contribute 
to the completeness of the individual standards and could result in the improvement of 
individual standards and the overall framework for financial reporting. Second, this study 
responds to the relevant calls for research on empirical evidence about the economic 
consequences of mandatory disclosures (see Leuz and Wysocki, 2016; Hassan et al., 2009; 
Bushee and Leuz, 2005; Kang and Pang, 2005).  
The findings are subject to the limitation that applies to all studies measuring compliance 
with mandatory disclosure requirements: although the necessary procedures and specific 
criteria were followed, measuring compliance with mandatory disclosures always entails a 
degree of subjectivity. Additionally, our research focuses on a single year. Considering the 
significant amount of time required for manually scoring each company in the sample, we opted 
for capturing diversity across different countries for the first year following the implementation 
of the revised standards. Thus, we examine a large number of observations across many 
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countries, instead of covering more years but for a smaller number of countries. Future research 
could examine compliance with other IFRS’ (or other national standards’) mandatory 
disclosures for longer periods and for financial firms which are excluded from this study.  
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Table 1: Number of companies examined across countries and industries. 
 
Country 
Basic 
materials 
Consumer 
Goods 
Consumer 
Services 
Healthcare Industrials 
Oil & 
Gas 
Technology Telecoms Utilities Total 
AUSTRIA 1 0 0 1 8 2 0 1 2 15 
BELGIUM 2 1 3 2 1 0 0 2 0 11 
DENMARK 0 3 0 5 4 1 0 0 0 13 
FINLAND 5 1 2 1 7 1 2 1 1 21 
FRANCE 1 10 10 2 10 2 3 1 3 42 
GERMANY 5 7 3 3 6 0 2 1 2 29 
GREECE 1 0 1 0 3 1 0 1 1 8 
IRELAND 0 4 3 2 3 0 0 0 0 12 
ITALY 1 5 1 0 3 2 1 1 6 20 
NETHERLANDS 3 3 2 0 4 2 2 1 0 17 
NORWAY 2 1 1 0 2 8 0 1 0 15 
PORTUGAL 4 3 0 0 4 1 0 2 3 17 
SPAIN 1 1 1 1 9 3 1 1 5 23 
SWEDEN 3 2 2 1 8 0 1 2 0 19 
SWITZERLAND 3 5 1 6 10 1 1 1 0 28 
UK 10 11 21 3 17 7 6 4 4 83 
TOTAL 42 57 51 27 99 31 19 20 27 373 
 
Industries are defined as in the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) Level 2. 
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Table 2: Frequency and distribution of compliance scores. 
 
Compliance 
score (%) 
IAS 36_CS IAS 38_CS Aver_1 Aver_2 
0-0.09 5 1.34% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.10-0.19 1 0.27% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
0.20-0.29 1 0.27% 0 0.00% 1 0.27% 0 0.00% 
0.30-0.39 5 1.34% 2 0.54% 1 0.27% 3 0.80% 
0.40-0.49 9 2.41% 6 1.61% 8 2.14% 3 0.80% 
0.50-0.59 23 6.17% 9 2.41% 9 2.41% 15 4.02% 
0.60-0.69 17 4.56% 44 11.80% 33 8.85% 29 7.77% 
0.70-0.79 70 18.77% 17 4.56% 67 17.96% 65 17.43% 
0.80-0.89 87 23.32% 122 32.71% 117 31.37% 123 32.98% 
0.90-100 155 41.55% 173 46.38% 137 36.73% 135 36.19% 
N 373 100.0% 373 100.0% 373 100.0% 373  
Mean 0.819 
 0.859  0.839  0.840  
SD 0.189 
 0.155  0.134  0.129  
Min 0.000 
 0.333  0.250  0.333  
Median 0.857 
 0.900  0.857  0.857  
Max 1.000 
 1.000  1.000  1.000  
 
The table presents compliance levels with IAS 36 and IAS 38 separately as well as on average. Aver_1 assumes 
that each standard is of equal importance, and thus, each standard has equal weight. Aver_2 assumes each 
mandated item is of equal importance, irrespective of how many items a standard mandates and in which standard 
the item is included. N stands for number of firms, while N% stands for number of firms as a percentage of the 
total number of firms in the sample (i.e., 373).  
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Table 3: Paragraphs in IAS 36 and IAS 38 for which high non-compliance is observed 
IAS 36 – Impairment of Assets 
Paragraph Sub-paragraph N % compliance 
129 
An entity that reports segment information 
in accordance with IFRS 8 shall disclose the 
following for each reportable segment 
129-a 
the amount of impairment losses recognised in profit or loss and in other comprehensive income 
during the period 
254 59.4% 
129-b 
the amount of reversals of impairment losses recognised in profit or loss and in other 
comprehensive income during the period. 
73 42.5% 
131 
An entity shall disclose the following 
information for the aggregate and the 
aggregate reversals impairment losses 
recognised during the period for which no 
information is disclosed in accordance with 
paragraph 130 
131-b 
the main events and circumstances that led to the recognition of these impairment losses and 
reversals of impairment losses 
258 50.4% 
134 
An entity shall disclose the information 
required by (a)–(f) for each cash-generating 
unit (group of units) for which the carrying 
amount of goodwill or intangible assets with 
indefinite useful lives allocated to that unit 
(group of units) is significant in comparison 
with the entity’s total carrying amount of 
goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite 
useful lives. 
134-a 
the carrying amount of goodwill allocated to the unit (group of units) 
355 79.4% 
134-b 
the carrying amount of intangible assets with indefinite useful lives allocated to the unit (group 
of units). 
90 50.0% 
134-d 
if the unit’s (group of units’) recoverable amount is based on value in use 
  
134-d-i 
a description of each key assumption on which management has based its cash flow projections 
for the period covered by the most recent budgets/forecasts. Key assumptions are those to which 
the unit’s (group of units’) recoverable amount is most sensitive 
332 87.7% 
134-d-ii 
a description of management’s approach to determining the value(s) assigned to each key 
assumption, whether those value(s) reflect past experience or, if appropriate, are consistent with 
external sources of information, and, if not, how and why they differ from past experience or 
external sources of information 
332 83.7% 
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Table 3: continued 
IAS 36 – Impairment of Assets 
Paragraph Sub-paragraph N % compliance 
 
134-d-iii 
the period over which management has projected cash flows based on financial budgets/forecasts 
approved by management and, when a period greater than five years is used for a cash-generating 
unit (group of units), an explanation of why that longer period is justified 
332 87.6% 
 
134-d-iv 
the growth rate used to extrapolate cash flow projections beyond the period covered by the most 
recent budgets/forecasts, and the justification for using any growth rate that exceeds the long-term 
average growth rate for the products, industries, or country or countries in which the entity 
operates, or for the market to which the unit (group of units) is dedicated. 
332 87.6% 
IAS 38 – Intangible Assets 
Paragraph Sub-paragraph N % compliance 
118 
An entity shall disclose the following for 
each class of intangible assets, 
distinguishing between internally generated 
intangible assets and other intangible assets: 
 
118-a 
whether the useful lives are indefinite or finite and, if finite, the useful lives or the amortisation 
rates used; 
373 82.0% 
118-b 
the amortisation methods used for intangible assets with finite useful lives; 
369 81.3% 
118-d 
the line item(s) of the statement of comprehensive income in which any amortisation of intangible 
assets is included; 
367 81.7% 
122 
An entity shall also disclose:  
 
 
 
122-a 
for an intangible asset assessed as having an indefinite useful life, the carrying amount of that asset 
and the reasons supporting the assessment of an indefinite useful life. In giving these reasons, the 
entity shall describe the factor(s) that played a significant role in determining that the asset has an 
indefinite useful life. 
107 56.1% 
For the information to be presented in this table, we set the following criteria: i) compliance per item/paragraph should be less than 90%; ii) each item/paragraph should be 
applicable to equal or more than 20% of our sample firms i.e., 73 companies (N).  
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Table 4 – Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
MVjt is the market value of a company j four months after the publication of the financial statements relating to 
the financial period (WC08001); Disperj is the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts (I/B/E/S) (last I/B/E/S 
forecast prior to the EPS announcement), scaled by share price; Accurj is the absolute value of the difference 
between mean I/B/E/S forecast (last I/B/E/S forecast prior to the EPS announcement) and actual EPS, scaled by 
stock price and multiply -1; BVEj is the book value of net assets at the end of the financial period (WC03501); NIj 
is the net profit after tax for the financial period (WC01751); CSj is the mandatory disclosure compliance score; 
SIZEjt is natural logarithm of the market value of a company j four months after the publication of the financial 
statements (WC08001); Impairj is an indicator variable that takes 1 if an impairment is reported and 0 otherwise 
(hand collected); Intj is the ratio between total intangible assets, including goodwill, and total assets (hand 
collected); AnFolj is the number of analysts contributing to the forecast as reported by I/B/E/S; Horj is measured 
as the number of months from the forecast date until the company releases its actual earnings (I/B/E/S); Lossj is 
an indicator variable for loss making companies; NI_Chj is the absolute value of the change in earnings between 
current earnings and that of the previous year, scaled by last year's earnings; AWCAj is the absolute value of 
abnormal working capital accruals scaled by total assets; Readability is the logarithmic transformation of annual 
report page count; the vector; US_Listj is a binary variable that takes a value of one when the firm is listed in the 
US and zero otherwise (identifed via DataStream); Mkt_Devj is the market capitalisation of listed companies as a 
percentage of GDP for each country (World Bank); Enforcej is an index combining the level of activity of 
independent enforcement bodies and important features of the audit environment likely to affect the quality of 
enforcement of financial reporting requirements by auditors in a country (Preiato et al. 2013) where the higher the 
index the stronger the enforcement environment; Indj takes a value of one when a firm is categorised into 
‘manufacturing’ on the basis of their industry participation, according to ICB, and zero otherwise. 
 
 
Variables Mean St. dev p25 Median p75 
Dependent  
MV 1.07 0.98 0.46 0.81 1.33 
Disper 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.04 
Accur -0.08 0.16 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 
Independent 
BVE 0.41 0.16 0.29 0.41 0.51 
NI 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.08 
SIZE 15.64 1.25 14.85 15.58 16.40 
Impair 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Int 0.27 0.41 0.09 0.21 0.40 
AnFol 2.87 0.56 2.67 3.00 3.23 
Hor 3.93 0.30 3.71 3.99 4.11 
Loss 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NI_Ch 0.59 4.39 0.07 0.30 0.79 
AWCA 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.04 
Readability 5.12 0.44 4.82 5.10 5.43 
US_List 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mkt_Dev 0.89 0.58 0.44 0.76 1.38 
Enforce 19.35 3.53 16.00 20.00 22.00 
Ind 0.66 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00 
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Table 5 – Pearson’s correlation coefficients  
Variables Aver_1 Aver_2 IAS36_CS IAS38_CS MV BVE NI Disper Accur SIZE Impair Int AnFol Hor 
Aver_1 1              
Aver_2 0.956*** 1             
IAS36_CS 0.821*** 0.806*** 1            
IAS38_CS 0.719*** 0.661*** 0.193*** 1           
MV 0.146*** 0.136** 0.103** 0.125** 1          
BVE 0.074 0.056 0.065 0.048 0.442*** 1         
NI 0.056 0.057 0.008 0.087* 0.374*** 0.209*** 1        
Disper 0.192*** 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.092* -0.027 -0.135*** 0.092* 1       
Accur -0.183*** -0.186*** -0.178*** -0.097* 0.011 0.087* -0.085 -0.869*** 1      
SIZE -0.019 0.016 0.073 -0.122** 0.103** 0.056 0.118** -0.080 0.083 1     
Impair -0.053 -0.088* 0.015 -0.109** -0.186*** -0.090* -0.075 -0.018 0.001 0.219*** 1    
Int 0.068 0.083 0.059 0.045 0.157*** 0.053 0.236*** 0.056 -0.026 0.009 -0.128** 1   
AnFol 0.048 0.092* 0.158*** -0.110** 0.048 -0.013 0.061 0.053 -0.029 0.651*** 0.115*** 0.062 1  
Hor -0.164*** -0.165*** -0.174*** -0.071 -0.165*** -0.088 -0.071 0.039 -0.050 -0.239*** -0.068 0.059 -0.237*** 1 
Loss 0.015 -0.001 -0.001 0.027 -0.087* -0.039 -0.371*** 0.060 -0.094* -0.168*** 0.124** -0.073 -0.138*** -0.027 
NI_Ch -0.130** -0.102** -0.069 -0.139*** 0.025 0.084 0.196*** -0.057 0.037 0.057 0.004 0.007 0.062 0.004 
Mkt_Dev 0.262*** 0.275*** 0.278*** 0.112** 0.247*** 0.135*** 0.198*** 0.336*** -0.296*** 0.158** -0.080 -0.015 0.159*** -0.163*** 
Enforce 0.248*** 0.274*** 0.321*** 0.035 0.116** 0.042 0.165*** 0.543*** -0.479*** 0.281*** -0.015 0.019 0.204*** 0.046 
AWCA 0.064 0.074 0.049 0.051 0.068 0.096* 0.033 -0.032 0.007 -0.179*** 0.030 0.029 -0.095* 0.006 
Readability -0.136*** -0.119** -0.077 -0.139*** -0.210*** -0.196*** -0.135*** -0.235*** 0.211*** 0.271*** 0.200*** -0.047 0.115** 0.111** 
Ind 0.035 0.045 0.025 0.029 -0.015 0.116** -0.010 -0.096** 0.100* -0.042 0.002 -0.136*** -0.106** -0.062 
US_List 0.100** 0.102** 0.059 0.101** -0.006 -0.043 -0.002 0.047 -0.058 0.069 0.047 0.103** 0.007 -0.024 
 
Table 5 – Continued 
Variable Loss NI_Ch Mkt_Dev Enforce Ind AWCA Readability US_List 
Loss 1        
NI_Ch -0.077 1       
Mkt_Dev -0.024 0.001 1      
Enforce -0.050 0.050 0.342** 1     
Ind 0.042 -0.096* -0.030 -0.087* 1    
AWCA -0.056 0.059 -0.165* -0.100* -0.061 1   
Readability 0.057 0.043 0.021 -0.035 -0.031 -0.020 1  
US_List 0.029 -0.011 0.011 0.084 -0.045 0.049 -0.065 1 
 
N = 373. Variables’ definitions are discussed in Table 4. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Multivariate analyses 
 
Variables 
Value relevance  
(H1) 
Analysts’ forecast dispersion  
(H2) 
Analysts’ forecast accuracy  
(H3) 
Aver_1 Aver_2 
IAS36_CS 
& 
IAS38_CS 
Aver_1 Aver_2 
IAS36_CS 
& 
IAS38_CS 
Aver_1 Aver_2 
IAS36_CS 
& 
IAS38_CS 
Intercept 
-0.048 
(-0.11) 
-0.068 
(-0.15) 
0.043 
(0.09) 
0.349 
(2.97)*** 
0.337 
(2.90)*** 
0.348 
(3.31)*** 
-0.111 
(-0.88) 
-0.104 
(-0.84) 
-0.144 
(-1.05) 
BVE 
0.666 
(3.52)*** 
0.676 
(3.57)*** 
0.663 
(3.52)*** 
      
NI 
7.409 
(9.12)*** 
7.398 
(9.11)*** 
7.429 
(9.20)*** 
      
CS 
0.452 
(2.51)** 
0.520 
(2.80)*** 
 
-0.066 
(-2.32)*** 
-0.062 
(-2.06)*** 
 
0.053 
(1.62) 
0.053 
(1.48) 
 
IAS36_CS   
0.328 
(2.94)*** 
  
-0.044 
(-2.39)** 
  
0.055 
(1.99)** 
IAS38_CS   
0.098 
(0.60) 
  
-0.015 
(-0.65) 
  
-0.009 
(-0.31) 
Mkt_Dev 
0.166 
(3.04)*** 
0.164 
(3.01)*** 
0.161 
(2.92)*** 
0.026 
(3.84)*** 
0.026 
(3.80)*** 
0.030 
(4.77)*** 
-0.038 
(-3.57)*** 
-0.038 
(-3.57)*** 
-0.029 
(-3.69)*** 
Enforce 
0.007 
(0.83) 
0.006 
(0.83) 
0.005 
(0.56) 
0.006 
(3.77)*** 
0.006 
(3.78)*** 
0.005 
(4.20)*** 
-0.005 
(-3.22)*** 
-0.005 
(-3.24)*** 
-0.006 
(-3.30)*** 
AWCA 
0.120 
(0.24) 
0.093 
(0.19) 
0.114 
(0.23) 
-0.060 
(-0.92) 
-0.058 
(-0.89) 
-0.059 
(-1.06) 
0.011 
(0.14) 
0.009 
(0.11) 
0.029 
(0.35) 
Readability 
-0.096 
(-1.32) 
-0.098 
(-1.36) 
-0.098 
(-1.35) 
-0.006 
(-0.77) 
-0.006 
(-0.73) 
-0.007 
(-0.96) 
0.006 
(0.67) 
0.005 
(0.64) 
0.013 
(1.12) 
SIZE  
 
 
-0.027 
(-4.32)*** 
-0.027 
(-4.30)*** 
-0.028 
(-5.39)*** 
0.020 
(3.31)*** 
0.019 
(3.30)*** 
0.022 
(3.49)*** 
Impair  
 
 
0.029 
(2.84)*** 
0.028 
(2.73)*** 
0.029 
(3.08)*** 
-0.031 
(-2.70)*** 
-0.030 
(-2.64)*** 
-0.038 
(-2.93)*** 
Int  
 
 
0.010 
(1.58) 
0.010 
(1.58) 
0.012 
(1.80)* 
-0.009 
(-1.29) 
-0.009 
(-1.30) 
-0.011 
(-1.39) 
AnFol  
 
 
0.047 
(4.35)*** 
0.047 
(4.40)*** 
0.048 
(4.48)*** 
-0.043 
(-3.07)*** 
-0.043 
(-3.08)*** 
-0.048 
(-3.24)*** 
Hor  
 
 
0.014 
(0.84) 
0.015 
(0.88) 
0.015 
(1.04) 
-0.039 
(-1.96)** 
-0.039 
(-1.98)** 
-0.040 
(-2.01)** 
Loss  
 
 
0.036 
(1.30) 
0.036 
(1.31) 
0.014 
(0.65) 
-0.126 
(-1.61) 
-0.126 
(-1.61) 
-0.121 
(-1.56) 
NI_Ch  
 
 
-0.003 
(-2.48)*** 
-0.003 
(-2.42)*** 
-0.002 
(-1.68)* 
0.002 
(1.76)* 
0.002 
(1.71)* 
0.002 
(1.83)* 
US_List  
 
 
-0.001 
(-0.07) 
-0.001 
(-0.08) 
-0.008 
(-0.79) 
0.0001 
(0.00) 
0.0001 
(0.00) 
0.003 
(0.20) 
Ind  
 
 
-0.019 
(-1.91)* 
-0.019 
(-1.90)* 
-0.012 
(-1.49) 
0.009 
(0.84) 
0.009 
(0.82) 
0.006 
(0.54) 
DLeg_Or Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 359 359 359 359 359 361 352 352 353 
F-Stat 21.12*** 21.28*** 20.40*** 13.44*** 13.41*** 12.12*** 4.03*** 4.02*** 3.90*** 
Adj. R2 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.57 0.56 0.59 0.34 0.34 0.35 
Max VIF 2.92 2.91 2.97 3.15 3.14 3.17 3.14 3.13 3.17 
 
Compliance levels with IAS 36 (IAS36_CS) and IAS 38 (IAS38_CS). Aver_1 assumes that each standard is of equal 
importance, and thus, each standard has equal weight. Aver_2 assumes each mandated item is of equal importance, 
irrespective of how many items a standard mandates and in which standard the item is included. MVjt is the market value of 
a company j four months after the publication of the financial statements relating to the financial period (WC08001); Disperj 
is the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts (I/B/E/S) (last I/B/E/S forecast prior to the EPS announcement), scaled by 
share price; Accurj is the absolute value of the difference between mean I/B/E/S forecast (last I/B/E/S forecast prior to the 
EPS announcement) and actual EPS, scaled by stock price [we multiply this variable by -1 so as to be interpreted as accuracy; 
the higher the better]; BVEj is the book value of net assets at the end of the financial period (WC03501); NIj is the net profit 
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after tax for the financial period (WC01751); CSj is the mandatory disclosure compliance score; SIZEjt is natural logarithm 
of the market value of a company j four months after the publication of the financial statements (WC08001); Impairj is an 
indicator variable that takes 1 if an impairment is reported and 0 otherwise (hand collected); Intj is the ratio between total 
intangible assets, including goodwill, and total assets (hand collected); AnFolj is the number of analysts contributing to the 
forecast as reported by I/B/E/S; Horj is measured as the number of months from the forecast date until the company releases 
its actual earnings (I/B/E/S); Lossj is an indicator variable for loss making companies; NI_Chj is the absolute value of the 
change in earnings between current earnings and that of the previous year, scaled by last year's earnings; AWCAj is the 
absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals scaled by total assets; Readability is the logarithmic transformation of 
annual report page count; the vector; US_Listj is a binary variable that takes a value of one when the firm is listed in the US 
and zero otherwise (identifed via DataStream); Mkt_Devj is the market capitalisation of listed companies as a percentage of 
GDP for each country (World Bank); Enforcej is an index combining the level of activity of independent enforcement bodies 
and important features of the audit environment likely to affect the quality of enforcement of financial reporting requirements 
by auditors in a country (Preiato et al. 2013) where the higher the index the stronger the enforcement environment; Indj takes 
a value of one when a firm is categorised into ‘manufacturing’ on the basis of their industry participation, according to ICB, 
and zero otherwise; DLeg_Or is a set of dummy variables capturing legal systems of French, Scandinavian and German 
origin (Djankov et al. 2008), English being the benchmark group. 
Tests employ the Heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator 3 (HC3); Variance inflation factor (VIF); 
Outliers have been defined and excluded using observations for which the standardised residuals lie outside the range of +/-
2 standard deviations. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
